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google/gke-security

google

gke-security

Plans, configures, and hardens Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) security. Covers Workload Identity Federation, Secret Manager integration, RBAC hardening, Binary Authorization, Network Policies (Dataplane V2), Pod Security Standards, and IAM roles. Use when securing GKE clusters, setting up Workload Identity, hardening RBAC configurations, or configuring GKE secrets. Don't use for general network routing configuration (use gke-networking instead).

New~3.4kUpdated Jun 28, 2026

GKE Security

This reference covers security configuration for GKE clusters. The golden path enforces a hardened security posture by default.

MCP Tools: get_cluster, check_k8s_auth, get_k8s_resource, apply_k8s_manifest, update_cluster

Golden Path Security Defaults

Setting Golden Path Value Day-0/1 Notes
workloadIdentityConfig.workloadPool <PROJECT>.svc.id.goog Day-0 Workload Identity Federation for Pods
secretManagerConfig.enabled true Day-1 Google Secret Manager integration
secretManagerConfig.rotationConfig enabled: true, rotationInterval: 120s Day-1 Automatic secret rotation
rbacBindingConfig.enableInsecureBindingSystemAuthenticated false Day-0 Blocks legacy system:authenticated bindings
rbacBindingConfig.enableInsecureBindingSystemUnauthenticated false Day-0 Blocks legacy system:unauthenticated bindings
nodeConfig.shieldedInstanceConfig.enableSecureBoot true Day-0 Verifiable boot integrity
nodeConfig.shieldedInstanceConfig.enableIntegrityMonitoring true Day-0 Runtime integrity checks
nodeConfig.workloadMetadataConfig.mode GKE_METADATA Day-0 Blocks legacy metadata API, enforces Workload Identity
Private cluster + Dataplane V2 settings See the gke-networking skill Day-0 Private nodes, private endpoint enforcement, ADVANCED_DATAPATH

Workload Identity Federation

Workload Identity is the recommended way for pods to access Google Cloud APIs. It eliminates the need for static service account keys.

Setup

# 1. Create a Google Service Account (GSA)
gcloud iam service-accounts create <GSA_NAME> \
  --project <PROJECT_ID> \
  --display-name "Workload Identity SA" \
  --quiet

# 2. Grant IAM roles to the GSA
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "<ROLE>" \
  --quiet

# 3. Create Kubernetes Service Account (KSA)
kubectl create namespace <NAMESPACE>
kubectl create serviceaccount <KSA_NAME> --namespace <NAMESPACE>

# 4. Bind KSA to GSA
gcloud iam service-accounts add-iam-policy-binding \
  <GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
  --role roles/iam.workloadIdentityUser \
  --member "serviceAccount:<PROJECT_ID>.svc.id.goog[<NAMESPACE>/<KSA_NAME>]" \
  --quiet

# 5. Annotate KSA
kubectl annotate serviceaccount <KSA_NAME> \
  --namespace <NAMESPACE> \
  iam.gke.io/gcp-service-account=<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com

See assets/workload-identity-pod.yaml for a test pod.

Verification

kubectl run workload-identity-test \
  --image=gcr.io/google.com/cloudsdktool/cloud-sdk:slim \
  --serviceaccount=<KSA_NAME> --namespace=<NAMESPACE> \
  --rm -it -- gcloud auth list --quiet

Secret Manager Integration

The golden path enables Secret Manager with automatic rotation. Secrets are synced to Kubernetes Secrets.

# Verify Secret Manager is enabled on cluster
gcloud container clusters describe <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --format="value(secretManagerConfig.enabled)" \
  --quiet

# Enable if not already (Day-1 change)
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --enable-secret-manager \
  --secret-manager-rotation-interval=120s \
  --quiet

Mounting Secrets via CSI Volume (Deployment Example)

Once the Secret Manager add-on is enabled, workloads can mount secrets as volumes using the Secrets Store CSI driver. This requires two steps:

  1. Define a SecretProviderClass to specify which secrets to retrieve from Secret Manager.
  2. Mount the volume in a Deployment referencing that class.

[!IMPORTANT] Production Best Practice: Always demonstrate workload integrations (like Secret Manager CSI) using production-standard Deployment manifests rather than raw Pod manifests.

Step 1: Create the SecretProviderClass

apiVersion: secrets-store.csi.x-k8s.io/v1
kind: SecretProviderClass
metadata:
  name: app-secrets-provider
  namespace: default
spec:
  provider: gke  # Identifies GKE managed provider
  parameters:
    secrets: |
      - resourceName: "projects/<PROJECT_ID>/secrets/db-password/versions/latest"
        fileName: "db-password.txt"

Step 2: Mount the secret in a Deployment

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app
  namespace: default
spec:
  replicas: 2
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: secure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: secure-app
    spec:
      serviceAccountName: secure-ksa  # Must be bound to GSA with Secret Manager Secret Accessor role
      containers:
      - name: app
        image: <IMAGE>
        volumeMounts:
        - name: secrets-volume
          mountPath: "/var/secrets"
          readOnly: true
      volumes:
      - name: secrets-volume
        csi:
          driver: secrets-store.csi.k8s.io
          readOnly: true
          volumeAttributes:
            secretProviderClass: "app-secrets-provider"

RBAC Hardening

The golden path disables insecure legacy RBAC bindings that grant broad access to system:authenticated and system:unauthenticated groups.

# Verify insecure bindings are disabled
gcloud container clusters describe <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --format="yaml(rbacBindingConfig)" \
  --quiet

Best practices for RBAC:

  • Use namespace-scoped Roles over cluster-wide ClusterRoles
  • Bind to specific Groups or ServiceAccounts, never to system:authenticated
  • Audit permissions via MCP: check_k8s_auth(parent="...", verb="list", resourceType="pods", namespace="...") (or kubectl auth can-i --list --as=<user>)
  • Review bindings via MCP: get_k8s_resource(parent="...", resourceType="clusterrolebinding") (or kubectl get clusterrolebindings,rolebindings --all-namespaces)

See the gke-multitenancy skill for enterprise RBAC planning and https://docs.cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/best-practices/rbac.md.txt

Binary Authorization

Not enabled in golden path by default but recommended for production image provenance:

# Enable Binary Authorization
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --binauthz-evaluation-mode=PROJECT_SINGLETON_POLICY_ENFORCE \
  --quiet

Network Policies

Dataplane V2 (golden path) provides built-in Network Policy enforcement. Apply default-deny per namespace:

# MCP (preferred)
apply_k8s_manifest(parent="...", yamlManifest="<contents of default-deny-netpol.yaml>")

# kubectl fallback
kubectl apply -f ./assets/default-deny-netpol.yaml -n <NAMESPACE>

GKE Sandbox (gVisor)

For running untrusted workloads in an isolated sandbox:

# Enable on cluster (Standard clusters)
gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> --enable-gke-sandbox --quiet

# Use in pod spec
# Add: runtimeClassName: gvisor

Pod Security Standards (Golden Path)

Pod Security Standards define three profiles that restrict what pods can do. The restricted profile is the golden path default for production namespaces.

Profile Level Use Case
privileged Unrestricted System namespaces (kube-system),
: : : infrastructure controllers :
baseline Minimally restrictive Shared/dev namespaces, legacy apps
: : : being migrated :
restricted Golden path Production workloads -- blocks
: : : privilege escalation, host access, :
: : : root :

Enforce via namespace labels (Pod Security Admission):

apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: production
  labels:
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/enforce: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/warn: restricted
    pod-security.kubernetes.io/audit: restricted

Gradual rollout strategy:

  1. Start with warn + audit on existing namespaces to identify violations
  2. Fix non-compliant workloads (remove privileged, hostNetwork, root user, etc.)
  3. Enable enforce once all workloads pass

restricted blocks: running as root, privilege escalation, host networking/PID/IPC, host path volumes, and most capabilities. The golden path workload-identity-pod.yaml already complies.

With Dataplane V2 (golden path), you can enable logging for Network Policy decisions. Not a golden path default -- recommended for security auditing.

gcloud container clusters update <CLUSTER_NAME> --region <REGION> \
  --enable-network-policy-logging \
  --quiet

This logs allowed and denied connections, useful for troubleshooting Network Policy rules and auditing traffic flows.

Common IAM Roles

The five most common predefined IAM roles for GKE:

Role Purpose When to Use
roles/container.admin Full control over Platform team admins
: : clusters and : managing cluster :
: : Kubernetes : lifecycle :
: : resources : :
roles/container.clusterAdmin Manage clusters but Cluster operators
: : not project-level : who create/delete :
: : IAM : clusters :
roles/container.developer Deploy workloads Application
: : (pods, services, : developers deploying :
: : deployments) : to existing clusters :
roles/container.viewer Read-only access to Monitoring,
: : clusters and : auditing, or :
: : Kubernetes : read-only dashboards :
: : resources : :
roles/container.clusterViewer List and get CI/CD pipelines that
: : cluster details : need cluster :
: : only : metadata :

Principle of least privilege: Start with roles/container.viewer or roles/container.developer and escalate only as needed. Avoid granting roles/container.admin broadly.

Service Accounts & Agents

  • GKE Service Agent (service-<PROJECT_NUMBER>@container-engine-robot.iam.gserviceaccount.com): Automatically created. Manages nodes, networking, and cluster operations on your behalf. Do not remove or modify its permissions.
  • Node Service Account: By default, nodes use the Compute Engine default service account. For production, create a dedicated SA with minimal permissions and assign it via node pool config.
  • Workload Identity: The recommended way for pods to access Google Cloud APIs. Maps a Kubernetes ServiceAccount to a Google IAM ServiceAccount — see Workload Identity setup above.

Cross-Service Authentication Patterns

Common patterns for granting GKE workloads access to other Google Cloud services:

# Grant a GKE workload access to Cloud Storage
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/storage.objectViewer" \
  --quiet

# Grant a GKE workload access to Cloud SQL
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/cloudsql.client" \
  --quiet

# Grant a GKE workload access to Pub/Sub
gcloud projects add-iam-policy-binding <PROJECT_ID> \
  --member "serviceAccount:<GSA_NAME>@<PROJECT_ID>.iam.gserviceaccount.com" \
  --role "roles/pubsub.subscriber" \
  --quiet

In all cases, the GSA must be bound to a KSA via Workload Identity (see setup above). The pod then uses the KSA to authenticate as the GSA.

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Overall Score

88/100

Grade

A

Excellent

Safety

92

Quality

86

Clarity

87

Completeness

83

Summary

GKE Security is a comprehensive reference guide for hardening Google Kubernetes Engine clusters. It outlines a "golden path" security posture covering Workload Identity Federation, Secret Manager integration, RBAC hardening, Binary Authorization, Network Policies, and Pod Security Standards. The skill provides both gcloud CLI commands and Kubernetes manifests to configure these security features, with clear scope boundaries and production-ready examples.

Detected Capabilities

gcloud CLI executionkubectl manifest applicationIAM policy bindingKubernetes resource inspectionYAML manifest generationService account creation and configuration

Trigger Keywords

Phrases that MCP clients use to match this skill to user intent.

workload identity setupgke rbac hardeningsecret manager integrationpod security standardsnetwork policy enforcementbinary authorizationgke iam rolescluster security hardening

Referenced Domains

External domains referenced in skill content, detected by static analysis.

docs.cloud.google.comwww.apache.org

Use Cases

  • Configure Workload Identity Federation for pod authentication
  • Set up Secret Manager integration with CSI volume mounting
  • Harden RBAC configurations and audit Kubernetes permissions
  • Enforce Network Policies and default-deny rules per namespace
  • Apply Pod Security Standards (restricted profile) to production namespaces
  • Enable Binary Authorization for image provenance enforcement
  • Assign minimal IAM roles to GKE service accounts and workloads
  • Plan cross-service authentication for GKE workloads accessing Cloud Storage, Cloud SQL, and Pub/Sub

Quality Notes

  • Excellent scope definition: skill clearly states its domain (GKE security hardening) and explicitly excludes out-of-scope topics (e.g., network routing delegated to gke-networking skill)
  • Golden Path defaults documented in structured table with Day-0/Day-1 priorities, helping agents understand implementation sequencing
  • Comprehensive Workload Identity setup with step-by-step bash commands, followed by verification procedures
  • Secret Manager integration includes production-best-practices callout emphasizing Deployments over Pods
  • Pod Security Standards explained with graduated rollout strategy (warn → audit → enforce), addressing practical migration concerns
  • All supporting YAML files included and production-hardened: workload-identity-pod uses distroless image, non-root user, dropped capabilities, read-only filesystem
  • Default-deny NetworkPolicy example is minimal and correct
  • IAM roles table provides clear when-to-use guidance aligned with principle of least privilege
  • References to MCP tools (get_cluster, apply_k8s_manifest, check_k8s_auth) demonstrate integration awareness
  • Cross-references to related skills (gke-networking, gke-multitenancy) help users understand skill boundaries
  • No hardcoded secrets, no overly broad shell commands, all code examples include parameter substitution placeholders
Model: claude-haiku-4-5-20251001Analyzed: Jun 29, 2026

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Version History

  1. v1.1

    Content updated

    ✦ AINo behavioral changes detected.

    2026-06-28

    Latest
  2. v1.0

    2026-06-24

    View This VersionInitial version

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